Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
Results. The Policy Office requested that we perform procedures to review the methodology developed to accurately identify and value all military equipment. The Policy Office intended the process to identify and value military equipment to satisfy financial statement requirements that changed how military equipment is reported. We coordinated with the Policy Office and jointly developed agreed-upon procedures to review the methodology. The procedures reviewed four primary areas: the military equipment universe, program valuation, program valuation waivers, and DoD decision makers' information needs.
To evaluate the completeness of the military equipment universe, we executed a very limited test, which showed that known programs were included in the universe. The Policy Office expanded the universe after they provided the initial data to the Office of Inspector General. Although our review did not identify any excluded programs, we determined that the Policy Office had not developed a process to validate the completeness of the military equipment universe.
ii ii Our review of 48 programs and subprograms showed that the Policy Office had completed valuations for 19 programs or subprograms and waived 29 programs or subprograms. All 19 programs or subprograms with completed valuations had deficiencies. We reviewed the waiver process for the remaining 29 programs and determined that 12 of those programs or subprograms lacked sufficient documentation to support their waiver status.
To determine if the baseline methodology satisfied the needs of DoD decision makers, we distributed questionnaires among 42 program office points of contact. The 19 timely questionnaire responses indicated that the baseline information did not adequately address program office information needs.
Management Comments.
Although not required to comment, the Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis disagreed with the audit determinations that:
• the Policy Office approach did not include a process to validate that the universe contained all military equipment;
• the valuation team was incorrect in its treatment of some program end items, but believed that it warranted study; and
• the questionnaire responses did not adequately address program office information needs and would be used primarily for financial reporting purposes.
Auditor Response. We believe that the process of reviewing the universe list with program managers and using information from military equipment accountability and maintenance databases should be considered part of the process to identify programs, not a process to validate the completeness of the universe. We agreed with the Director's assessment that performing additional analysis on this program and similar programs is reasonable and would be beneficial. Further, we believe that the personnel at the program offices were the only DoD decision makers that had any significant exposure to the results of the military equipment valuation and distributing the survey to other decision makers would not have been logical or beneficial. See the Overview section of the report for a discussion of the management comments and the Management Comments section of the report for the complete text of the comments.
Management Actions. During the engagement, we developed and submitted to the Policy Office three issue papers discussing the lack of source documentation, concerns with the update methodology, and deficiencies found in one of the methods used to account for modifications. Additionally, we discussed the issue involving the lack of program manager attestations with the Policy Office. In response, the Policy Office began implementing corrective actions to resolve the issues. Specifically, the Policy Office began holding meetings with Defense Finance and Accounting Service field offices to determine the availability of historical cost documentation. Additionally, the Policy Office revised the baseline update methodology and prepared a draft position paper that described a revised methodology to value modifications. The Policy Office also incorporated an assertion requirement into the valuation process. Using this approach, along with validating and reviewing the universe list with program executive officers, program managers, and Component points of contact, the Policy Office believed it captured all significant military equipment programs and modifications to those programs. However, the approach did not include a process to validate that the universe contained all military equipment. The effort to identify all visible and known military equipment programs was ongoing and, according to the Policy Office, the universe had grown to 1,108 programs as of September 15, 2005.
To evaluate the completeness of the universe, we asked program executive officers, program managers, and Component points of contact to identify additional, less recognizable programs that were not included. In our limited test, we submitted a questionnaire to 42 program office points of contact and asked whether they managed any military equipment programs excluded from the military equipment valuation universe (see Appendix C, question 10). We received 19 timely responses; however, only 18 provided responsive answers to this question. Fourteen of the 18 replied that they did not manage any military programs other than those on the list. Only four responders identified military programs as not included in the universe. Further review showed that those programs were actually included in the universe. Consequently, our test did not identify any excluded programs.
Program Valuations. On August 27, 2004, KPMG provided a list of 858 programs, which included 326 completed reviews, 149 in-process reviews, and 383 scheduled reviews. We judgmentally selected a sample of 22 programs from completed evaluations and from additional programs identified during our September 2004 site visit. Eight of the programs included subprograms; therefore, we increased our sample by adding 26 subprograms for a total sample size of 48 programs and subprograms.
The Policy Office had determined values for 19 of the 48 programs and subprograms. We identified issues in all 19 valuations. Some of our areas of concern include:
• historical cost documentation -acquisition and disposal dates -costs and expenditures
• accounting for modification costs
• judgments made by the valuation team
• baseline target date
• documentation of program manager agreement with the valuations Historical Cost Documentation. The valuation methodology did not use historical cost documentation when it was available. The methodology calculated the program valuations based on data obtained from various financial, acquisition, and logistics systems. Although that methodology would have been proper if obtaining initial historical costs was not practical, it was improper (according to SFFAS No. 23) when historical cost documentation should have been available. As defined by DoD Regulation 7000.14-R, "DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR)," volume 4, chapter 6, "Property, Plant, and Equipment," August 2000, supporting documentation includes:
• purchase invoices,
• sales and procurement contracts,
• DD Form 1354 "Transfer and Acceptance of Military Real Property,"
• ENG Form 3013 "Work Order/Completion Report,"
• construction contracts, and
• work orders generated independently of the entity in possession of the property. Accounting for Modifications. The methodology used to capitalize and depreciate modification costs in 4 of the 19 sample programs and subprograms did not comply with SFFAS No. 6, "Accounting for Property, Plant, and Equipment," June 1996, as amended; the DoD FMR; and the Policy Office's proposed business rules on modifications, modernizations, and upgrades. Instead, the valuations added the modification costs to the program's original acquisition costs in order to average the modification costs across all of the program's end items. As a result, the valuations assumed that all of the program's end items had been modified when a number of end items had not been modified. Further, the valuations capitalized and depreciated the modification beginning with the period the Program Management Offices (PMOs) placed the first end item in service, which may not be the period in which the expenditure for the modification occurred. Therefore, the methodology the Policy Office used for the three program valuations was not in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. As a result, the estimated net book value may be misstated.
During the engagement, we informed the Policy Office of the issue we found with the method used to account for some modifications. In response, the Policy Office provided a draft position paper that described a revised methodology to value modifications. The Office of Inspector General has reviewed the revised policy and has provided comments. If the Policy Office accounts for modifications using the methodology discussed in its revised policy, it should adequately resolve the issues. We will revisit this issue when the Department has implemented the revised policy.
Valuation Team Judgments.
According to an analysis performed by Government Accountability Office auditors, the valuation team selected the ground control stations as the primary end item for the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program and allocated total system development cost and expenditure data on the basis of the number and expected life of the control systems. In fact, the program procured end items for aircraft and control stations with such various useful lives, cost, count, and susceptibility to disposal to presumably warrant treatment as independent subprograms. A more reasonable approach would be to allocate the costs between different parts or subprograms of the program. Because the valuation team had selected the control stations as the primary end item, the program valuations would not recognize aircraft loss, which is both more likely and more costly. The valuation team for the Tactical Automated Security System Program inappropriately calculated a portion of program values using an average unit cost obtained from a sample of contracts. Because the program incurred costs during a time when SFFAS No. 23 required the use of historical costs, calculated averages derived from a sample of contracts was unacceptable.
Baseline Update. The completed preliminary valuations and those program valuations that remained to be completed will require additional updating as of September 30, 2006. Additional work will be required to update the valuations because DoD does not have financial and accountability systems that would provide accurate and timely information. To overcome these challenges, the Policy Office proposed an update solution that would require program information from organizations beyond its direct control. Specifically, substantial assistance will be required from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the PMOs, the Military Department Financial Management Components, and the Naval Space and Warfare Systems Center. Although the proposed update solution might be logical if DoD had more time, the aggressive baseline date may not allow adequate time for the update methodology's development and implementation. Information Needs Not Met. The questionnaire responses indicated that the baseline did not adequately address program office information needs and would be used primarily for financial reporting purposes. Generally, the responders indicated the following.
Program Manager
• Program valuations did not provide access to new or improved information.
• Program valuations, based on program averages over the entire life of the program, did not provide information at a useful level.
• Depreciation was not useful in making managerial decisions.
• More accurate and consistent accounting and accountability systems would be more useful.
Only 16 of the 19 questionnaire responders provided responsive answers to the question that addressed the usefulness of a validation of the estimated useful life. Eight of the 16 responders indicated that a validation of the estimated useful life of military equipment would be useful 6 (see Appendix C, question 9). Additionally, when asked whether they agreed with the Policy Office's calculated program valuations (see Appendix C, question 2), two responders provided additional comments that indicated that program valuations could be more useful. One of those responders indicated that the information might be more accurate if they considered program costs such as development, modification, operation, and support costs. However, the responders did not indicate that the program valuations were not in compliance with any DoD policy or accounting standards by omitting these program costs 
Management Comments and Auditor Response
Management Comments. Although not required to, the Director of Acquisition Resources and Analysis commented, stating that the growth of the military equipment universe is evidence that the Policy Office has a process to validate the completeness of the universe. The Director stated that before the baseline valuation effort, the Department did not have a single source for identifying military equipment programs. The Director stated that her office believes its process of data accumulation and review included sufficient data sources and procedures for ensuring the completeness of the military equipment universe.
Auditor Response. The growing number of programs in the universe does provide evidence that the process to identify programs has been ongoing. However, it does not provide evidence that the Policy Office has a process to validate the completeness of the universe. Reviewing the universe list with program managers and using information from military equipment accountability and maintenance databases should be considered part of the process to identify programs; however, we do not believe it is an effective process to validate the completeness of the universe. A process to validate the completeness of the universe might include selecting a sample of military equipment used in the field and tracing it to the accountability systems or the universe.
Using its current process, the Policy Office had identified 858 programs as of August 27, 2004 , 1074 programs as of February 28, 2005 , 1090 programs as of May 16, 2005 , and the number of programs in the military equipment universe continues to grow, as would be expected when developing the universe. However, this process, which originally did not identify hundreds of programs, cannot be considered adequate for validating the completeness of the universe. The Policy Office should not assume that because a process appears adequate for developing a universe, it is also adequate for validating that the universe developed is complete. The process to validate the completeness of the universe should ensure that all military equipment units were included in the balance sheet.
Management Comments. The Director stated that her office does not believe that the valuation team was incorrect in treating the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program end item as a total system. The Director stated that her office believes that the valuation of this and similar programs warrants study, given the subject's complexity and applicability to more than a single military equipment program. The Director stated that her office will research the subject and recommend an approach for identifying and accounting for such programs.
The Director also stated that her office believes that the Office of Inspector General survey missed the point of the military equipment valuation effort. The Director stated that because the Policy Office used data that the Project Managers provided to establish the military equipment baseline, it was understandable that the program managers would see no value added. The Director stated that the military equipment valuation project was oriented toward decision makers at higher echelons. She said that the project provides standard, consistent data on programs that can be used for decision making, but no senior leaders were surveyed for the report. The Director stated that she expects the value of the military equipment effort to increase as it moves from the program level to the asset level.
Auditor Response. We disagree with the Director's comment that the survey missed the point of the military equipment valuation effort because it was distributed to program office personnel but not senior leaders. The personnel at the program offices were the main DoD decision makers that had any significant exposure to the results of the military equipment valuation. Therefore, distributing the survey to other decision makers would not have been logical or beneficial. Further, in the report we noted that program valuations might be useful to senior leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense or Congress who are further removed from programs.
The Director stated that it was understandable that program managers would see no value added because they already possess the information. However, the Director stated in an earlier response that before the baseline valuation effort, the Department did not have a single source for identifying military equipment programs. The baseline valuation effort presents the Policy Office an opportunity to provide the program managers, who make the day-to-day decisions for the programs, with a single source of information that would be useful and readily accessible.
Agreed-Upon Procedures, Auditor Actions, and Results
We performed the baseline valuation methodology procedures agreed upon by the Policy Office and the Office of Inspector General. This section contains the agreed-upon procedures, the auditor actions, and the results of accomplishing those procedures as of April 15, 2005. Procedure. Evaluate the process used by the Policy Office to identify the universe of military equipment.
Auditor Action. We reviewed the methodology that the Policy Office implemented to ensure the completeness of the military equipment universe. We held discussions with key personnel from the Policy Office. We obtained a written description from the Policy Office about the approach used in the universe development. We obtained a list of sources that the Policy Office used to develop the initial military equipment program universe. Additionally, we obtained the list of programs included in the military equipment universe as of August 27, 2004. We reviewed the Universe Construction Source Reference Descriptions 7 provided by KPMG. We identified the significant sources of supporting documentation for the sample programs. We examined the sources that are common to all the Military Departments and those sources that are unique to each Department. We evaluated the logic of the process used by KPMG to ensure that all military equipment programs were valued and then we evaluated the reasonableness and reliability of the sources.
Because the Policy Office was still developing the program universe, we could not perform a full completeness test. However, we performed a limited completeness test within our judgmental sample. We requested that the program managers identify any military programs that were excluded (omitted but not as part of a waiver) from the Policy Office's military equipment valuation effort. We reviewed those programs identified as omitted from the universe and determined that all were actually included in the universe.
Results. Program Managers did not identify any programs excluded from the universe and our limited testing of the program universe did not identify missing programs. However, we noted that the Policy Office methodology did not include a process to validate the completeness of the military equipment universe.
Procedure. Review the baseline valuation methodology developed by the Policy Office to report military equipment values.
Auditor Action. We obtained introductory briefing charts on the baseline valuation methodology developed by the Policy Office to report military equipment values. We also obtained the baseline business rules.
We analyzed the standard valuation model developed by the Policy Office and KPMG and questioned the methodology for capitalizing and depreciating modification costs. We met with the Policy Office and discussed possible methods of addressing modification costs.
We reviewed the proposed baseline valuation update methodology for reasonableness. We identified issues with the update methodology.
We accompanied the Policy Office and KPMG on five site visits to observe the military equipment valuation process. We prepared a draft overview of the process and submitted the overview to the Policy Office for comment.
We reviewed the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy Office briefing charts and business rules.
Results. Based on our reviews and observations, we developed and submitted three issue papers addressing the lack of source documentation, concerns with the update methodology, and deficiencies in the baseline approach. In response, the Policy Office stated they were working towards resolving the issues. Specifically, the Policy Office began holding meetings with Defense Finance and Accounting Service field offices to determine the availability of historical cost documentation. The Policy Office also revised the baseline update methodology and provided a new position paper describing a revised methodology to value modifications.
Procedure. Review and determine the reasonableness of the military equipment valuations that the Policy Office had completed.
Auditor Action. We reviewed the standard valuation model to determine how the Policy Office had calculated the valuations. Then we judgmentally selected a sample of 22 programs from 326 programs with reviews completed by the Policy Office and also from programs identified during our September 2004 site visit. We noted that the sampled programs also contained subprograms. Therefore, we modified our judgmental sample by selecting 26 additional subprograms within our primary sample. As a result, our sample included 48 military equipment programs and subprograms. We reviewed supporting documentation for the appropriation and expenditure data, asset quantity data, and useful life. We identified that the Policy Office had completed program valuations for 19 of the 48 programs and subprograms.
Results. We identified problems with all 19 program valuations. Those problems included unsupported acquisition and disposal dates, unsupported program costs and expenditures, incorrect accounting for modification costs, and unacceptable judgments made by the valuation team.
Procedure. Review the waiver criteria the Policy Office used to exclude projects from the valuation process to determine the reasonableness of the exclusion.
Auditor Action. We held discussions with key personnel from the Policy Office and its contractor, KPMG. We also attended program review debriefings conducted by KPMG with some PMOs. We obtained copies of the waiver criteria. We identified 11 types of waivers and summarized pertinent criteria for issuing a waiver valuation exemption.
Results. In our judgmental sample, 29 of the 48 programs and subprograms received waivers; however, 12 of the 29 programs and subprograms did not have sufficient data to support a waiver.
Procedure. Determine whether the baseline that the Policy Office was developing for military equipment adequately addressed DoD decision makers' needs.
Auditor Action. We reviewed Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board guidance 8 about the objectives of Federal financial reporting. Using this guidance as a basis, we listed the DoD primary decision makers as program managers and executives and we identified their major information needs as budgetary integrity, operating performance, stewardship, and systems and control. We performed a limited needs test within our judgmental sample. We distributed a questionnaire to 42 program office points-ofcontact addressing whether the baseline met their information needs. We reviewed 19 timely responses and summarized the replies.
Results. The responses indicated that the information offers limited usefulness for program office decision making and would be primarily useful on financial reporting. 
